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The publisher and I chose as the first two volumes the two works that offer a com-
prehensive analysis of the socialist system. I would recommend that readers begin
with The Socialist System, a summary of its political economy that first appeared
in 1992, as it synthesizes several decades of my research, and then continue with
Economics of Shortage, published in 1980, where I sought to place analysis of the
socialist economy in operation on new foundations, and met with a degree of
worldwide interest that I had not expected either.
TWO BOOKS – TWO HISTORICAL JUNCTURES
Hardly more than a decade passed between the publications of the two books
(The Socialist System appeared in English in 1992 and Hungarian in 1993; Eco-
nomics of Shortage appeared in both languages simultaneously in 1980), but that
short period covered a great turn of events in modern world history: the demoli-
tion of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, initiated by the
change of system in the former socialist countries.
My thinking, my outlook on the world and my system of values did not un-
dergo any fundamental change, although I grew a good decade older and richer
with some important experience, of course. I held the same view of the socialist
system when the Iron Curtain still divided it from the West, as I did when the Iron
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Curtain had come down. Yet the two books differ in many respects, because each
was marked by the historical points in time when they were conceived and placed
before the public. I describe in detail the conception of each in my autobiography,
By Force of Thought (Kornai 2005, 2007). Here I will confine myself to the most
important differences.
As I was writing Economics of Shortage, the communist party still held a mo-
nopoly of power in Hungary. It sought also a monopoly of ideology, but it was un-
able to impose one fully. Instead, it supported, tolerated and banned works
(Rainer 2001; Révész 1997; Standeisky 1996). I weighed carefully during the
writing stage what were the conditions under which it was likely to appear. I
wanted the book to escape the “banned” category and join that of the “tolerated”
in Hungary, in other words, I wanted it to appear legally under the auspices of a
Hungarian publisher. Furthermore, I wanted it to reach readers in other socialist
countries, preferably by being translated and published there. But if nothing else
could be arranged, let it be found in the region’s academic libraries in English.
To that end I exercised conscious self-censorship. What I wrote was true to my
best conviction. I wrote the truth, but not the whole truth. Economics of Shortage
did not discuss subjects still taboo under the somewhat softened dictatorship that
ruled in Hungary at that time. It was still impossible to discuss openly in print how
the chronic, irremediable malaise of the socialist system was tied up with the po-
litical structure: the monopoly power of the communist party and the relation be-
tween the Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet empire.
Self-censorship is painful self-mutilation, a bitter feeling for an author. Yet
I decided it was better for the work to appear in mutilated form, in a legal way ac-
cessible to a wide readership, than in a complete form as a samizdat that could
reach only a tiny readership.
I achieved what I set out to do. The book, after bizarre adventures with publish-
ers’ readers described in detail in my autobiography, appeared and went through
three impressions in Hungary. It was published in China six years after the Hun-
garian edition, in 1986, and had soon sold a hundred thousand copies. Poland was
the only East European socialist country where the book was published in a regu-
lar commercial form. It was printed in Czechoslovakia but in a “limited edition”
for readers chosen by the communist authorities. The English translation went the
rounds in the Soviet Union as a samizdat; it did not appear in Russian until 1990,
the very end of the Gorbachev period. The list of countries and publication dates
reflects in a strange way the breakdown process of the socialist system.
As for what was left unsaid, those who were truly observant could read be-
tween the lines. The main messages of the book accelerated the process by which
tens of thousands of citizens of the socialist countries came to their senses. They
realized (and this understanding was confirmed strongly by many discussions
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I had after 1990 with earlier readers of the book) that half-hearted reforms were
not going to suffice to overcome the grave problems. The system itself had to be
changed.
I began preparations for The Socialist System in 1983 and started to write text
in 1988. The walls of the old system still stood, but they were crumbling. By the
time the book was finished, the concrete walls and barbed-wire fences that inhib-
ited people’s freedom of movement were down, and so were the constraints and
taboos on the free flow of ideas. While the word “party” did not appear in Eco-
nomics of Shortage, the substantive discussion in the The Socialist System began
with analysis of the party’s role, political power and ideology. The book stated
what I had been unable to express 12 years earlier: the origin and operation of the
socialist system can only be understood truly by starting from the role of political
power and official ideology.
Assessing scientific works is a matter for readers, journal reviews, and later, on
behalf of posterity, researchers into the history of theory. But the way an author
ranks his own works is not without interest either, although it will not be free of
feeling or bias. Asked which work of mine had the biggest influence, I would say
without hesitation Economics of Shortage. This impression can be confirmed in
several ways: citation counts, statements of contemporaries about influences on
their ideas, or numbers of reviews (e.g. Hámori 2012; Felcsuti 2012). That is why
my publisher, Kalligram decided to make Economics of Shortage the first volume
in this series. Asked which writing of mine in the ranking of my works I think is
the most important one, I would pick The Socialist System. That is my most ambi-
tious work, an attempt to synthesize several decades of my research, in which
I sought to provide an analysis that I intended should cover all the main attributes
of the system.
An attempt to summarize and to provide a broad view leaves too little space for
details. The title of Chapter 11 of The Socialist System is “Shortage and Inflation:
The Phenomena” and of Chapter 12, “Shortage and Inflation: The Causes”. Mag-
nifying or “zooming in” on these two chapters, we find that they cover most of the
subject-matter of Economics of Shortage. The latter gives much more details; it
gives the chance to analyse relations important in themselves that do not, how-
ever, constitute basic attributes of the system. Of the two books, Economics of
Shortage is the more colourful; it contains more ideas that were considered new
and intellectually stimulating at the time it appeared. The two books complement
each other and belong together, which is why the first two titles in the series share
an introduction.
I have a clear conscience in presenting these two books to future researchers.
Three decades have passed since the first appeared, two since the second, in which
changes of historic import have occurred in Hungary, the former socialist region,
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and the whole world. Many authors would rather withdraw what they wrote ear-
lier. I am glad we can now present the original books to readers in photographic,
scanned form, without changing a single word. I stand by every word I wrote then.
If a future historian wishes in future decades or centuries to look back on the 20th
century and understand the socialist system, which governed a third of humanity
at its peak, these two books will be among the vast literature available as source
materials.
But do these two works have something to say not only to historians specializ-
ing in socialism, but to the public today?
AN ANTIDOTE TO NOSTALGIA FOR THE OLD SYSTEM
There have been several international surveys to confirm that much of the public
in all post-socialist countries look back wistfully on the former socialist system
(Rose 2005). Hungary is among the countries where this nostalgia is at its highest
(Vásárhelyi 2005). Table 1 reports on a survey made in 2010. Adding together the
proportions in the first and second columns – those who agree wholly or partially
with comparative statements about the system – yields astonishing sums: some
two-thirds of the respondents are drawn more to the Kádár era (1957–1989) than
to the present conditions, considering that more attention was paid then to ordi-
nary people and that it was the fairer of the two.
Acta Oeconomica 62 (2012)
368 János KORNAI
Table 1
Evaluation of the Kádár system (percentages of respondents)
Statements Wholly Partially Disagree Don’t
agree agree know
The Kádár system paid more attention to the
problems of ordinary people 46 32 13 9
The change of system did more harm than
good to the country 27 41 24 8
The Kádár system was fairer than the
present one 33 36 21 10
The introduction of capitalism into Hungary
did more harm than good 28 46 17 9
Note: The survey covered a representative sample of 1000 persons.
Source: Communication from Mária Vásárhelyi based on the 2010 survey by the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences/Eötvös Loránd University Research Group of Communications Theory.
Unpublished data.
Table 2 approaches the problem from the opposite direction by measuring the
level of acceptance of the capitalist system.
What can explain the strength of retrospective acceptance of the old system in
this country? Why is the disillusionment with the new system greater than in most
other post-socialist countries? My guess is that there are several factors at work;
here I would like to express a few thoughts on one of these assumed influences.
The Nobel Prize-winning psychologist and economist Daniel Kahneman re-
ported on an exciting experiment in several of his works (Kahneman et al. 1993;
Redelmeier – Kahneman 1996). Colonoscopy, a diagnostic procedure for examin-
ing the large intestine, was until recently a highly painful examination that took
20–30 minutes. (The pain and discomfort have since been reduced substantially.)
In the period when the examination still caused pain, researchers asked volunteers
awaiting it to record continuously on the keys of a special instrument how severe
they felt the pain to be. The instrument would then plot a graph of the pain inten-
sity over time. When the examination was over, the respondents were asked to
gauge how painful it had been overall. The following were found. Those who
rated the examination overall less painful corresponded to those who had experi-
enced no or only slight pain towards the end of it – even if in some cases the graph
over time showed conclusively that they had suffered more than others had.
Kahneman drew far-reaching psychological conclusions from the experiment
and other similar studies covering both subjective assessments of suffering and
pain, and those of joys and happiness. Actual experiences (felt by the sufferers at
each moment) differed strongly from memories of the experiences, but the overall
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Table 2
Approval of change to capitalism (percentages of respondents)
Country 1991 2009 Percentage points of
difference between the two
Slovakia 69 66 –3
East Germany 86 82 –4
Russia 54 50 –4
Czech Republic 87 79 –8
Poland 80 71 –9
Ukraine 52 36 –16
Bulgaria 73 53 –20
Lithuania 76 50 –26
Hungary 80 46 –34
Notes: The question put in the survey was: “Do you approve of the move to capitalism?” The first
two columns show the proportion of respondents (who answered yes). The table was taken from
Hámori – Szabó (2010: 879).
assessments are based on the latter. “All’s well that ends well”, as they say. The
end of a sequence of events is recalled more vividly and shapes the memory of the
whole sequence more intensively than the intermediate stages do.
Let us return to the nostalgia felt for the Kádár era.1 It lasted for 35 years, of
which the early ones were a time of merciless reprisals not matched in Hungarian
history: hundreds of gibbets were erected, thousands served several years in
prison, and tens of thousands were thrown out of their jobs. Ubiquitous intimida-
tion bred mass servility. It was years before the repression gradually gave way to a
form of bribery called “goulash communism”, financed by foreign credits.
Throughout there remained the curbs on freedom of speech and the press, the need
for permission from the party secretary and personnel manager for foreign travel,
the omnipresence of corruption. Throughout there were long waiting lists for state
housing, telephone lines, and private cars, embittering many people. Nonetheless,
a loosening of control became tangible towards the end of the period. Hundreds of
thousands set out each weekend for Vienna’s Mariahilfer Strasse to buy fashion-
able articles, refrigerators or freezers. Party cadres too enjoyed holidays (and cap-
italist goods surpluses) on the Spanish or Italian coast. Managers sniggered with
employees over jokes against the communist system. Editors accepted with a wry
smile articles that stretched permissibility in pointing to some of the glaring short-
comings of socialism. These improvements were accompanied by continuing se-
curity of employment. Mass, open unemployment was unknown. In fact, there
was a labour shortage in many places, coupled in many others by “unemployment
within the gates”, much enjoyed by those fond of taking life easy at work.
This image of Hungary as “happiest barrack in the camp” remains sharpest in
the collective historical memory of the Hungarian public. This is the socialism
people long to have back.
Yet this was only the end of the story. This image of a disintegrating, increas-
ingly comfy Kádár regime that had lost its claws depicts only one, quite short
phase in the long history of the socialist system. The sufferings of previous phases
have been recorded by researchers into the system and in works of literature and
huge quantities of other documents,2 but these bitter experiences have faded in the
collective historical memories of most of the Hungarian public. The disgust at the
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1 In a superb lecture to a lay audience, Kahneman applied this train of thought to event se-
quences of several kinds (also on the Internet: Kahneman 2010). I extend the Kahneman the-
ory at my own intellectual risk to collective memory, the process by which a large community
absorbs historical experience into its soul.
2 In his splendid The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin‘s Russia, Orlando Figes (2007) gives an
astonishing account of how Soviet families lived and of ties between grandparents and grand-
children, parents and children, husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, and friends. The rich
and varied documentation on which the book rests includes carefully kept and concealed dia-
ries, letters between family members and friends, statements filed at the secret police, work by
old regime is much stronger in countries like East Germany, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia, where the dictatorship remained hard until the last moment.
One antidote to nostalgia for the old system is to explore its real nature. Those
fully aware of the inherent attributes and chronic problems of the socialist system
and how they derive from its fundamental traits become more resistant to the wiles
of a distorted assessment based on short memory. The brutal or less brutal repres-
sion, the crude or less crude, more artful restriction of freedom of speech, and the
very intensive and in some fields excruciating shortages: all are necessarily
concomitants of the socialist system.
Of course I do not imagine that those who fully endorsed the first statement in
Table 1 (“The Kádár system paid more attention to the problems of ordinary peo-
ple”) will suddenly change their view if they read The Socialist System, if for no
other reason because it is not written in a “dramatic” style – it does not describe
the traumas caused by the system or present a brightly painted picture of people’s
sufferings and humiliations. I aimed at an objective style that appealed to the intel-
lect, not the feelings. Much though I would like many people to read the book,
I cannot in my most confident moments imagine it being a best-seller. I do not see
huge numbers of people setting about scrutinizing its 640 pages.
However, I would think it is desirable for as many as possible among those
with a formative influence on public opinion to do so. Here I would mention
teachers, from primary up to university level, those working in the press and the
media, professional politicians, leading civil servants past and present, and practi-
tioners of many other professions. I would like them to include many who are very
critical of the old system, yet actually know little about it, and content themselves
with a few slogans of dismissal and hatred. These two books are not just for pro-
fessional researchers into comparative economics or political history. They pro-
vide useful information for a broad opinion-making stratum. I would like to en-
courage them to rethink and reshape their ideas.
HOW ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM CREEP IN
Both books place at the centre of their analysis two “pure” theoretical models: the
classical socialist system and the classical capitalist system differ diametrically;
their basic attributes are wholly opposite to each other. One is a shortage econ-
omy, the other a surplus economy; one is marked by signs of excess demand, the
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contemporary writers, interviews, and personal memories of elderly people still alive at the
time of the political changes. Let us hope there will one day be a similar book on private life in
Hungary under Rákosi and Kádár.
other by those of excess supply.3 One displays a chronic shortage of labour, the
other chronic unemployment. The main mechanism of allocation in one is bureau-
cratic coordination and in the other market coordination. One has public owner-
ship as its dominant property form and the other private ownership.
Such extreme abstraction – opposing two “pure” cases – serves its purpose
while the analysis remains on a purely theoretical plane. But real, historical struc-
tures are never “pure”, never strictly homogenous. Some elements of one system
creep into the other. Even in the most brutal period of Stalinism, the surreptitious
black economy continued, despite its persecution, to obtrude the market mecha-
nism typical of capitalism between buyer and seller. Into socialism in its slightly
tamer post-Stalinist variants there crept the half-prohibited, half-permitted “grey
economy”, and even small private businesses appeared here and there.
This section is not concerned with these, but offers a few thoughts on “creep-
age” in the opposite direction. Three effects will be treated:
1. The effect after the change of system of values inherited from socialism.
2. The effect of “islands of shortage economy” that persist under the capitalist
system.
3. The “soft budget constraint” syndrome under capitalism.
Values inherited from socialism
Let me recommend to the attention of readers Section 24.4 of The Socialist Sys-
tem, which is entitled “Preview: The Socialist System’s Legacy and Post-social-
ism”.4 At this point, I would like to pick out one idea that has gained special imme-
diacy these days. Let me quote from the book:
great masses of people continue to adhere to moral values – attributes of a notion of a
‘good society’ – that their upbringing taught them to rate as socialistic values. Mean-
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3 Economics of Shortage and The Socialist System deal only briefly with capitalism for the pur-
pose of contrasting it with socialism. The line of argument is continued and augmented in my
recent volume of studies Gondolatok a kapitalizmusról (Thoughts on Capitalism, 2011),
where the “surplus economy” and other characteristics of capitalism are placed to the fore in
the discussion. Editor’s note: see Felcsuti (2012).
4 Section 24.4 does not contain a normative statement or recommend any political programme.
Instead, in line with the general objectives of the book, it makes some objective predictions.
The legacy of the socialist system is given; what will its effect be on the future course of
events? Twenty years have passed, and the new edition of the book provides the best opportu-
nity for checking the fulfilment of the predictions. As I see it, almost all the conjectures and ex-
pectations have proven correct. I reread those few pages with unease and dissatisfaction as a
citizen, but with some reassurance and satisfaction as a researcher and author. I leave it to read-
ers to make this comparison for themselves.
while, they are confused; they are also drawn toward moral values that contrast starkly
with these values instilled over a long period. ... To what do citizens of a postsocialist
country aspire? To be left in peace by the state, undisturbed by a million regulations, and
unrestricted by a hundred obligations? Or do they demand an active state that takes wise
measures, cares for the unfortunate, protects the environment, and regulates the uninhib-
ited rise in prices? Do they accept or even welcome the fact that all may earn as much as
they can, or are they outraged by high incomes and demand that they be heavily taxed?
... there is also the possibility that many will relapse from time to time into the discred-
ited ideology of bureaucratic rule, etatism, paternalism, and egalitarianism (pp.
577–580).
International comparative researches into value choices have shown that ad-
herence to the socialist system, including the values, beliefs and moral positions
of the former era, is especially strong in some post-socialist countries; Hungary is
one of them. The New Europe Barometer (2009) survey had respondents in 13
post-socialist countries state whether they agreed that individuals should look af-
ter themselves and their own livelihood (full agreement = 1 point, partial agree-
ment = 2 points) or whether the state should look after everyone’s material welfare
(partial agreement = 3 points, total agreement = 4 points). The average score in the
13 countries was 2.67 points, i.e. closer to paternalism than to emphasis on indi-
vidual responsibility. The average obviously embraced a wide spread of scores: a
sizeable proportion of the public calls strongly for state paternalism. Many other
surveys show a very high proportion of people in the post-socialist region giving a
high rating to the values of equality and fair income distribution. A party that
plays on these expectations is likely to receive the greatest support in the political
arena.
It would be useful to know better to what extent egalitarian values and demand
for paternalist state care can be ascribed to the mental inheritance at the time of
systemic change – persistence of the old system of values – and how much to the
new system itself.
More than two decades after the first free elections, can the old expectations
and value system still be influential? It is not impossible. Researchers showed re-
cently how elements of ideology inherited from the Horthy system (1919–1945),
– the conservative interpretation of the role of the nation and the family, the irre-
dentist aspirations claiming the restoration of pre-war “greater” Hungary, etc. –
have persisted underground over the 45 years since the Horthy regime collapsed,
and all this now undergo a resurgence. János M. Rainer (2012) uses the apt ex-
pression “underground streams” to describe the process: ideas concealed beneath
the surface, passing by word of mouth from generation to generation, and break-
ing out when the chance presents itself. A similar course of events may be happen-
ing now with socialist ideas. Indeed, they need not be concealed, as they are stated
openly by politicians on both sides of the political spectrum. Yet it may be that
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conscientious people are prompted to call for fairer distribution and fuller state
care irrespective of socialistic antecedents or heritage, by the many injustices of
today’s society, the destitution of people abandoned without a chance of earning a
living, and the lack of prospects for young people starting life at an irredeemable
disadvantage. That may be one reason why many, even of those who reject
one-party communist rule and all variants of the old, pre-1989 socialist system,
yearn for some new, still unrealized socialist system that differs essentially from
capitalism. It would be a worthwhile scientific task to study the ideological ante-
cedents and social stimuli behind the beliefs, expectations and systems of values
held by the Hungarian public today.
Islands of shortage economy
The final section of my book, The Socialist System, quoted just now, dealt not
only with inherited values, but with inherited institutions as well. I rightly gauged
when writing the book that this complex structure could not be changed all of a
sudden, that reorganization would occur gradually, in many stages. I was also
right in saying, “the old institutions may hamper the development of the new sys-
tem for a long time. It takes a good while for the new institutions to evolve”
(p. 578). But missing from the lines published two decades ago and now easily
discerned with hindsight is the tenacity and strength of the resistance to institu-
tional change, at least in certain spheres.
The most glaring example of this is the health sector. Here public ownership
still reigns, whereas private ownership has come to dominate most areas of the
economy. Indeed, the latest moves are imposing on it the ultimate form of public
ownership: ownership of hospitals and clinics is now being transferred from local
government bodies to the central government. Provision, at least on paper, is free
of charge to those entitled to it. Feeble attempts to introduce modest contributions
to the costs of services were beaten off. Now where state ownership dominates
and goods or services are provided free, a shortage economy necessarily appears.
This is one of the main conclusions of Economics of Shortage and it is confirmed
by the broader, more comprehensive analysis of The Socialist System.
Capitalism is not a shortage economy, but a surplus economy. It is marked not
by overly tight production plans that force enterprises to produce more than they
are really capable of, but by chronic unutilized capacity. Retail shelves are not
empty, but packed. There is no queuing for years for a phone line, but a plethora of
phone companies vying for subscribers and persuading them to make maximum
use of their services.
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Both books still have immediacy because they show how the state health sector
works as a surviving island of socialism’s shortage economy amidst the sea of the
capitalist surplus economy. Look around the health sector and examples of all the
phenomena of a shortage economy described in the two books can be immediately
seen. The main mechanism for coordinating the provision and consumption of the
services is bureaucratic rationing involving queuing and long waiting lists. Forced
substitution occurs on a mass scale: patients are not seen by a chosen doctor or
treated in the hospital they would wish; they are prescribed cheaper medicines
than their accustomed, preferred ones. Patients, in any case in a defenceless posi-
tion, are still more defenceless in a shortage economy, where the supply side is
stronger than the demand side. An inevitable concomitant of a shortage economy
is the appearance of corruption, whereby those on the long demand side try to
bribe those on the short supply side. This takes the form in the health sector of in-
formal payments to staff, “gratitude money” as it is called in Hungary. Insulting
though the term corruption may sound, I, for one, cannot blame either those who
pay it or those who receive it, as it follows inevitably from the prevailing institu-
tional conditions.
Health care – owned by the state, subject to bureaucratic centralization, run by
command-economy methods, and free of charge only in name – is far from being
the only example of how distorted “islands” of the socialist system can persist or
recur under capitalism. There are similar ones, for example, in education and in
some segments of the welfare system. “Islands of shortage economy” also occur
in capitalist countries that never underwent the historical stage of having a social-
ist economy. One aid to recognizing them and understanding how they work is to
study thoroughly how the socialist system operated, when the shortage economy
extended to all spheres of life.
Soft and hard budget constraints
I came to recognize during my studies of the socialist system that the reason why
loss-making state-owned enterprises have no fear of financial collapse is that they
can reckon on their higher bodies to bail them out. Their financial situation im-
poses no hard constraint on their expenditures as the eventuality of rescue is built
into their expectations. This condition was termed a soft budget constraint (SBC)
in Economics of Shortage.5 The budget constraint would be hard if a firm could
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5 The term soft budget constraint and my ideas in connection with it first appeared in print in the
journal Econometrica in 1979, i.e. a year before the publication of Economics of Shortage. It
contained the text of the presidential address I had given at the Econometric Society Congress
of 1978, where I briefly summarized the ideas in my book, which was already in manuscript.
not count on rescue and persistent losses led to bankruptcy, failure of the firm.
If the budget constraint is soft, losses are not really a matter of life and death, and
managers do not need to take prices, costs and losses to heart. Under such condi-
tions, the incentive to reduce costs and enhance productivity economically weak-
ens. It is possible to initiate investments irresponsibly because the higher authori-
ties will pay the bill anyway if the costs are exceeded. Herein lays the main expla-
nation for the low efficiency of the socialist system.
Hardness or softness of the budget constraint is not a narrow problem of ac-
counting. It constitutes a syndrome, a complex group of social, political and eco-
nomic problems with several factors concurrently at work. It has a characteristic
operating mechanism and many kinds of deep and far-reaching consequences.
In the first appearance of the concept in my work, I contrasted the two “pure
models”, the classical socialist and classical capitalist systems, on an abstract
plane. The first is marked by softness of the budget constraint and the second by
hardness. But I was already pointing out that softening of the budget constraint
can also be seen in many areas of present capitalist practice (Kornai 1980, 2011:
328–329).
Over 30 years have passed since the first appearance of my views on SBC, and
the concept and associated theory can be said to have had a spectacular career.
I will try to divide that career up into periods.
In the first period, most economists felt that SBC was a mark of state-owned
enterprises under the socialist system. It applied there and only there, and they left
Sovietologists and researchers specializing in the communist system to investi-
gate it. The expression appeared often in works on the socialist system, but sel-
dom in other contexts.
The second period began with the change of system. It suddenly became intel-
lectually and politically fashionable for government offices and university eco-
nomics departments in the former communist countries to receive visits from a
succession of Western economics professors and international organization staff-
ers, who soon realized that the budget constraint in the post-socialist countries
was soft as well. It had to be hardened before the market economy would begin to
work as it should. There was not a World Bank or EBRD report that did not dis-
cuss the phenomenon. By that time, the sphere of ideas covered the post-socialist
transition, not just the socialist economy.
In the third period, the economists’ profession began to realize that the SBC
syndrome dwelt to the West of the former Iron Curtain as well. I have to admit that
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However, since the sphere of ideas of the soft budget constraint arose from the work done on
the book Economics of Shortage, it is justifiable to link it primarily with the 1980 book, not the
1979 article.
to my mind the recognition spread at the speed of a snail, but a less impatient as-
sessment would be that the concept and the theories associated with it became
known quite widely. Various economic dictionaries and encyclopaedias gave the
concept an entry. As I was writing these lines on 11 March 2012, I entered the
words “soft budget constraint” in quotes in the English-language Google search
and found 392,000 hits in 0.32 of a second.
Scrolling down the first few dozen hits, the discussion was not just about the
socialist system and the post-socialist transition, but in many cases also about the
soft budget constraint syndrome as found in the capitalist system. The vast quan-
tity of examples from several countries ranged from Italian hospitals to Chinese
private firms, and from the handling of Greek sovereign debt to the Japanese
banking sector.
The three periods are consecutive, but as in most cases of periodization, this
gives a somewhat simplified picture of the spread of the idea. In fact, there were
encouraging exceptions right from the start. Some researchers appreciated quite
early that SBC was not solely a socialist disease, to which the Western world was
immune.
The idea of a soft budget constraint has developed considerably since its first
appearance. Economics of Shortage put it in words. Later, the first mathematical
models were constructed, notably in a pioneering paper by Dewatripont – Maskin
(1995). Many researchers have since set about modelling mathematically one or
another relation of the syndrome. A question that especially took the fancy of sci-
entists working on a plane of abstract theory was why dynamic inconsistencies ap-
pear in the behaviour of decision-makers from whom strict and time-consistent
behaviour would be predicted by standard economics. Why do they pledge not to
bail out troubled organizations and then rescue them after all? In American busi-
ness parlance, why do they throw good money after bad? Attempts were made to
examine the problem through game theory. Other researchers used other mathe-
matical means to study the soft budget constraint syndrome.
Economics of Shortage kept to statements based on practical observations of
the phenomenon. Many later works used broad, data-based empirical examina-
tions, and some applied rigorous econometric analysis to test the hypotheses.
On the causes of the phenomenon, Economics of Shortage confined itself to a
single factor: the paternalist eye the state kept on its “children”, the state-owned
enterprises. Having given birth to them, the state had to ensure their survival. This
link certainly exists, but only as one explanatory factory of many, of course. As
mentioned earlier, I censored myself when writing the book. I hinted that the neg-
ative phenomena arise ultimately out of “certain social relations, institutional at-
tributes” (Kornai 1980, 2011: 583). I found, to my sorrow, that few of my Western
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colleagues understood our peculiar jargon: they did not catch on that by writing
“institutional attributes” emphatically at the end of the book, I was aiming at the
political system. They took my book to mean that I thought that the soft budget
constraint and paternalism were the main factors behind the grave problems in the
socialist economy and the ultimate cause of the negative phenomena. To this day,
I look back baffled and slightly saddened by this misunderstanding. Perhaps they
believed that I and those of my mind saw only that the state was paternalistic with-
out noticing how the state was bound up with the communist party and its monop-
oly of power, and could decide on the life or death of any state-owned enterprise
as it fancied.
By the time I wrote The Socialist System, I no longer had to rely on veiled allu-
sions. Paternalism and SBC could occupy their rightful place. Table 15.1 on page
361 of the English edition depicts the main line of causality as five blocks. The
deeper reasons (the undivided power of the Marxist-Leninist party; the dominant
influence of the official ideology) occupy Block 1 and the ultimate consequences
appearing on the surface Block 5 (forced growth, chronic shortage economy, etc.)
Far from being presented as the deepest causes, paternalism and the soft budget
constraint syndrome appear in the penultimate Block 4.
As scholars discovered ever more SBC phenomena, so the list of potential ex-
planatory factors lengthened as well. We look on cancerous diseases in a similar
way. Many types of tumours exist; many organs may be afflicted, and various
cancers can occur in each, differing in their courses and speeds, the likelihood of
their spread, their side-effects, and many other criteria. There may be several fac-
tors behind the origin of a cancer, from genetic susceptibility through lifestyle and
environmental factors, to infection. Yet we are still justified in talking of a family
of diseases because each variant has essential traits in common.
The soft budget constraint syndrome may appear in state-owned or privately
owned firms, in for-profit or non-profit organizations, in the state apparatus (on a
central or local level) and non-state institutions. There are cases of whole
branches of the economy being rescued, and ever greater heed is paid to the “top-
most” level of soft budget constraint phenomena, when entire countries are bailed
out financially by other countries and/or by international organizations.6
Each occurrence of SBC involves two players: an entity to be rescued and an-
other entity, the rescuer. The latter may be prompted to a rescue operation by vari-
ous factors. If the organization in trouble (whether an enterprise, bank, hospital,
local government organization, or even national government) is not bailed out,
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6 For a systematic review of the fields where soft budget constraint theory is applied, see Kornai
– Maskin – Roland (2003). The bibliography highlights the seminal works in each. The litera-
ture on the subject has grown considerably since, but I have no knowledge of a more recent
summary study.
there will be serious consequences: many people will lose their jobs, production
will be curbed by spill-over effects, state revenues will be reduced, and so on. The
economic consequences will encourage discontent and political tensions. But if
the bail-outs are repeated often, other troubles ensue. Decision-makers become
accustomed to rescues and come to expect them – and we are up to our necks in the
soft budget constraint syndrome, with all its harmful effects of encouraging waste
and reducing efficiency.
This dilemma is integral to the great international debate that broke out with
the international financial crisis in the autumn of 2008. Who should rescue banks
and giant corporations in financial trouble? Should a financial lifebelt be thrown
to countries threatened by state default? The European approach tends towards
hardening of the budget constraint, the American towards softening it – but, of
course, it is not so clear, for there are counter-currents everywhere, and those es-
pousing one therapy or the other will advance only the arguments that favour their
point of view. They largely omit to compare objectively all the advantages and
drawbacks of softening or hardening the budget constraint.
It is remarkable how the household budget constraint has softened worldwide.
Economics of Shortage could still state that the household budget constraint under
the socialist system is hard. But more and more households in the post-socialist re-
gion, including Hungary, discover that their income is no real constraint on their
spending, as they can obtain desired goods easily without paying cash. Credit
cards, instalment plans and secured loans have created an illusion of unlimited
purchases.
The indebtedness of the household sector will swell and swell until it bursts
like a bubble and it turns out that the spending is beyond the spenders’ means.
What happens then is that some of the indebted households cannot meet their re-
payments. The usual dilemma of a soft budget constraint appears. If the broke
households are not rescued, some of them will be in serious difficulties: utilities
will be cut off and dwellings repossessed. At that point, it is not just the political
and economic consequences that have to be weighed, but the moral demands of
social solidarity and compassion, as well. Certainly, these people are responsible
for the troubles into which they have drifted, but the hearts of all good-natured
people go out to the families who are dispossessed.
There were mass rescue campaigns in Hungary in 2011 and 2012, but were the
one bailed out really those in need, or were they the ones who saw profit in buying
or building dwellings for rent on a mortgage and, to put it plainly, their projects
“caught cold” because the business cycle did not behave as they expected? Bailing
them out marks a reappearance of SBC. The mass rescue was an encouragement
for them to try again.
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I could finish with the subject of the soft budget constraint at this point. I have
pointed to what can be found on the subject in my two books and to a current prob-
lem. Moreover, the Google figure might imbue me with a sense of achievement.
Yet I have to admit that discontent in me is stronger than my delight at the spread
of this idea. I am sure that scientific analysis of the syndrome is proceeding too
slowly.
The theoretical modelling is not comprehensive enough. The models (as is usu-
ally the case) map what is easily depicted in mathematical terms: here the differ-
ence between the promise by the superior body and the observance of the commit-
ment, i.e. the inconsistency in the decision-maker’s behaviour. This is important,
but it is just one side of a very complex sphere of problems. Many other phenom-
ena of the SBC syndrome still await examination.
The empirical work is not broad or comprehensive enough. Instead of referring
to guesses, it would be good to have statistical surveys as a basis for saying how
widely the soft budget constraint syndrome has penetrated capitalism.
Examining the secondary effects of the SBC syndrome is partly a theoretical
task, partly an empirical one. How does softening the constraint affect deci-
sion-makers’ sensitivity to prices and costs? According to the usual demand func-
tions, demand is determined mainly by price and income, but the explanatory
variables should also include an indicator expressing the softness/hardness of the
budget constraint. The basic axioms of standard microeconomics rest on the as-
sumption (not explicitly stated) that the budget constraint of decision-making
units is perfectly hard. The validity of all axioms needs re-examining if this is sup-
planted by an initial assumption that the budget constraint on some decision-mak-
ing units is not perfectly hard.
Behavioural economics sets out to explain decision-makers’ motivation as
fully as possible. It aims, for instance, to extend beyond the simplified statement
that firms “maximize profits”. One factor influencing motivation at all levels
(households, firms, public institutions, central governments) is certainly the de-
gree of hardness or softness of the budget constraint. The more virulent the factor
is, the more managers’ attention is transferred from production and market mat-
ters towards building close relations with government and politicians, for they
will give the help in times of trouble.
One especially painful shortcoming is that not a step has been taken to devise a
normative theory of the SBC syndrome. I am not expecting researchers to provide
a recipe for when to rescue and when not to, but theoretical work that assists in re-
thinking systematically the arguments for and against is needed.
Furthermore, there is an exciting question of political and intellectual history to
be addressed. Clearly, the appearance of the SBC syndrome in current capitalism,
in countries that never underwent a period of communist rule, is not a legacy of
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socialism. This syndrome is capitalism’s own product. That being so, is it right to
talk, as so many politicians, journalists and even academics do, of socialism
creeping into capitalism? Hayek’s famous book, The Road to Serfdom (Hayek
1944), left many people worried that any step away from the autonomy, self-de-
termination and self-reliance of the individual, firm or small community and from
the assumption of responsibility for its own actions, and any step towards extend-
ing state powers, was a step towards the socialist system. Though this expression
of the case may have gone too far, it is certainly so that the more the SBC syn-
drome intrudes, the more capitalism, at least in this important respect, comes to re-
semble the socialist system.
More than three decades have passed since the first appearance of the idea of
the soft budget constraint. I hope it will not take further decades before we come
much closer to answering these difficult questions.
THE SYSTEM PARADIGM
The discussion so far has been of the extent to which the content of the two books
has immediacy for readers today. However, there emerges another important
point: to what extent can the scientific apparatus and method of the two books be
used in analysing other subjects? Are the concepts and methods of examination,
and the philosophy of science position behind them, workable when applied to
other subjects?
The approach I have employed resembles in several respects those of two other
strands: institutional economics and behavioural economics. There is much over-
lap, but it may not be immodest to claim that these two books and my other works
added something to the methodology of the two strands mentioned.
Most works inspired by institutional or behavioural economics have a partial
nature. They describe and explain the behavioural or operative attributes of some
organization, legal institution or phenomenon. Both books treated here place the
emphasis on examining whole systems. One of the key issues in research is how
the elements of a complex social/economic/political edifice splice together, what
effects they have on each other, and what the main directions and counter-effects
of those are. In one study, I termed this approach the system paradigm (Kornai
2000).
Those employing the system paradigm are especially interested in phenomena
that are system-specific – typical of one system or the other. They set out to clarify
what features of the system bring the system-specificities into being. Capitalism
has deeply rooted, genetic features that necessarily prompt entrepreneurs to inno-
vation; this is one of its principal characteristics, advancing technical progress at
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high speed. Socialism, on the other hand, has deeply rooted, genetic traits that
cause such inducements to be absent, or inescapably slow down the innovation
process.
The scales do not tip in capitalism’s favour in every respect. The socialist sys-
tem, at a certain level of growth, reaches a state in which all reserves of labour
have been absorbed and excess demand for it appears, whereas the capitalist sys-
tem has an unfortunate, but genetically inescapable trait of mass, chronic unem-
ployment that eases in times of economic upswing but never ceases altogether.
The methodology of the system paradigm is applied in the two books of the
Kalligram life’s work series appearing now. At most, it mentions in passing for
the sake of comparison one or other of the system-specific traits of capitalism.
I have attempted in some more recent of works of mine to go further. My
Thoughts on Capitalism uses the methodology of the system paradigm for a gen-
eral analysis of the capitalist system. This is a direct continuation of my earlier
work. The graph on page 235 of the Hungarian edition of Economics of Shortage
presents the activity rates and level of economic development in 1980 (Kornai
1980, 2011). The later volume reproduces the graph and contrasts it with the rela-
tion in 2009 (Kornai 2011: 114). To take another example, the line of argument in
The Socialist System is illustrated in condensed form in the diagram on page 361,
showing the main directions of causality among the elements of the system. The
new volume uses a diagram with a similar purpose to show those of the capitalist
system. (Kornai 2011: 140). The latter diagram is a kind of mirror reflection of the
one for the socialist system.
The article entitled “Centralization and the Capitalist Market Economy in
Hungary” published in early 2012 differed from the volume (Kornai 2011) just
mentioned in dealing not with general, lasting attributes of a system, but with
the structure of power and control built up under the capitalist system by the
present Hungarian regime (Kornai 2012).7 Concepts such as the alternative
mechanisms of bureaucratic and market coordination, or the affinity or “for-
eign-ness” of elements of the system, had proven to be viable. It seemed justified
to approach matters by asking whether we see around us random, single problems,
or a system with defined, describable attributes in the making. Wherever the struc-
ture of the system becomes fixed, and mutually reinforcing relations develop
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7 Volume III in my Selected Works will include my 1957 book, which appeared in English as
Overcentralization in Economic Administration (Kornai 1957/1959). Included in the same
volume will be my 2012 article on the present-day tendency to centralization in Hungary
(Kornai 2012). The volume will provide an occasion for commenting with present-day eyes on
my earlier theoretical and empirical works on the subject of centralization. I do not wish to an-
ticipate myself here by examining the content of that important subject, merely to note the ap-
plicability of the methodology.
among its elements, it is almost inevitable that lasting effects specific to the sys-
tem will appear.
I am convinced that the system paradigm will prove workable in the hands of
other researchers. There are some, not a few in fact, who use it. I trust that this new
publication of Economics of Shortage and The Socialist System will help to spread
this research apparatus and method more widely.
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